Hi! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Warwick. My research interests focus on Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, and Mechanism Design. My work has theoretical implications in areas such as Industrial Organization, Political Economy, and Behavioral Economics.
I am currently on the 2024/25 job market. Here is my C.V.
Job Market Paper
This paper develops a framework to analyze the optimal sale of information. A data buyer, facing a decision problem under uncertainty, initially has access to an information structure that is private to him and determines his willingness to pay for any additional information. A monopolistic data seller, capable of designing tailored information structures, seeks to maximize revenue. Compared to Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2018), the novelty of this paper lies in two key features: (i) the type space consists of various information structures, and (ii) correlations are allowed between the data buyer’s initial information structure and the additional information structure offered by the data seller. My main result demonstrates that, in a large class of cases, the data seller can design and price information within a mechanism to fully extract the first-best surplus. Specifically, full surplus extraction is achievable when each lower-type buyer’s willingness to pay for information that fully supplements their initial information is weakly higher than that of all higher types.
Working Papers
“Contracting with Heterogeneous Beliefs”
I analyze the optimal design of incentive contracts in the context of belief heterogeneity between a principal and an agent.
“When to Go Negative in Political Campaigns?” (joint with Sinem Hidir)
We explore whether and when it is optimal for a privately informed incumbent politician to engage in negative campaigning by disclosing a scandal about the challenger’s corruption in order to persuade voters.
Work in Progress
“Think Different but Not Too Different”
This paper demonstrates that trade driven by differing beliefs is increasingly likely to be mutually detrimental as these differences grow.
“Signaling in Information Design”
I explore the equilibrium design of experiments in settings with two-dimensional uncertainty.
Teaching Experience
- University of Warwick
- Statistical Techniques B (UG, Spring 2021, Spring 2022)
- Mathematical Techniques B (UG, Fall 2020, Fall 2021)
- Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
- Advanced Microeconomics I (MA, Fall 2017)
- Advanced Microeconomics II (MA, Spring 2017)
- Shandong University
- Intermediate Microeconomics: Game Theory (UG, Fall 2014)