Hi! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Warwick, specializing in Information Economics, Mechanism Design, and Industrial Organization. My research investigates the interplay of information, beliefs, and incentives in strategic settings.
I am currently on the 2024/25 job market. Here is my C.V.
Job Market Paper
I develop a theoretical framework to analyze the optimal sale of information products in the digital economy. A data buyer initially has access to a private information structure that provides partial information about a payoff-relevant state. The buyer’s initial information determines their willingness to pay for additional data, creating information asymmetry that poses challenges for a monopolist data seller aiming to maximize revenue. My main findings show that the seller can extract the first-best surplus and achieve social efficiency by offering customized supplemental information products tailored to different buyer types. Specifically, the seller can implement first-degree price discrimination by strategically leveraging data correlations. Compared to Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2018), the novelty of my work lies in two key aspects: (i) the type space consists of various information structures, and (ii) correlations are allowed between the data buyer’s initial information structure and the additional information offered by the seller.
Working Papers
“Contracting with Heterogeneous Beliefs”
I analyze the optimal design of incentive contracts in the context of belief heterogeneity between a principal and an agent.
“When to Go Negative in Political Campaigns?” (joint with Sinem Hidir)
We explore whether and when it is optimal for a privately informed incumbent politician to engage in negative campaigning by disclosing a scandal about the challenger’s corruption to persuade voters.
Work in Progress
“Think Different but Not Too Different”
This paper demonstrates that trade driven by differing beliefs is increasingly likely to be mutually detrimental as these differences grow.
“Signaling in Information Design”
I explore the equilibrium design of experiments in settings with two-dimensional uncertainty.
Teaching Experience
- University of Warwick
- Statistical Techniques B (UG, Spring 2021, Spring 2022)
- Mathematical Techniques B (UG, Fall 2020, Fall 2021)
- Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
- Advanced Microeconomics I (MA, Fall 2017)
- Advanced Microeconomics II (MA, Spring 2017)
- Shandong University
- Intermediate Microeconomics: Game Theory (UG, Fall 2014)