Hi! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Warwick. My research interests are microeconomic theory, information economics, and industrial organization.
I am currently on the 2024/25 job market. Here is my C.V.
Job Market Paper
A data buyer, uncertain about a payoff-relevant state, has private information—a signal modeled as a finite partition of an expanded state space—that is only partially informative. A data seller, capable of generating arbitrarily correlated signals, aims to maximize revenue by selling an optimal menu of signals. We characterize the properties of this revenue-maximizing mechanism and demonstrate that, despite information asymmetry, first-best outcomes can still be achieved. Specifically, the seller can offer a supplemental signal tailored to each buyer type, priced at the buyer’s willingness to pay, ensuring socially efficient full surplus extraction.
Working Papers
“Contracting with Heterogeneous Beliefs”
We analyze the optimal design of incentive contracts in the context of belief heterogeneity between a principal and an agent.
“When to Go Negative in Political Campaigns?” (joint with Sinem Hidir)
We explore whether and when it is optimal for a privately informed incumbent politician to engage in negative campaigning by disclosing a scandal about the challenger’s corruption in order to persuade voters.
Work in Progress
“Think Different but Not Too Different”
“Signaling in Information Design”
Teaching Experience
- University of Warwick
- Statistical Techniques B (UG, Spring 2021, Spring 2022)
- Mathematical Techniques B (UG, Fall 2020, Fall 2021)
- Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
- Advanced Microeconomics I (MA, Fall 2017)
- Advanced Microeconomics II (MA, Spring 2017)
- Shandong University
- Intermediate Microeconomics: Game Theory (UG, Fall 2014)